Moneyball for the Modern Era (Chapter 1)

Everyone in baseball wants to hire Theo Epstein. His precipitous career ascent from up and coming star in the Padres front office to 2-time World Series champion GM with the Red Sox is the stuff of legend. In fact, his life story is the foundation for my “dream” career path and I am not afraid to admit it.

But when you break down what Epstein has done in Boston, the genius doesn’t seem that overwhelming. In fact, the argument could be made that those who played the biggest role in turning the Red Sox from lovable losers to perennial favorites are the business people responsible for ensuring that Fenway is sold out each and every night (and yes, I realize that Epstein is involved in these endeavors, but lets face it, he’s firmly on the baseball side of things). By protecting this guaranteed stream of income, the business operations staff of the Red Sox has enabled the club’s baseball people to essentially create a “dream team” of free agent stars.

Sure, there are the hometown heroes like Ellsbury, Pedroia, Papelbon, and Lester, but the brunt of the Red Sox talent has come via free agency or the quasi-free agency that is the trade deadline. From Adrian Gonzalez to David Ortiz, from Kevin Youkilis (ok, stretching it, but still a trade acquisition) to Carl Crawford, the Red Sox have been able to climb the last hurdle and break the “Curse of the Bambino” not by a stroke of luck, but by the stroke of a pen more than anything.

But beyond the Red Sox, Yankees, Phillies, Mets and Cubs, most teams in baseball today have to think creatively. They don’t have the room on the payroll to sign a Daisuke Matsuzaka for $100 million only to see him spend more time on the DL than on the mound. They don’t have the guaranteed revenue streams to sign a hometown hero like Derek Jeter to multiple free agent contracts, arguably at a rate above what the market would demand. It isn’t that the front office minds in cities like Cleveland, Kansas City, Milwaukee and Baltimore aren’t as sharp as those in Boston, New York, and Los Angeles (ok, maybe the guys in Baltimore aren’t that bright, I will give you that), its just that they don’t have the checkbook in their back pocket ready to bail them out of even the slightest mistake or bad break. Simply put, anyone could do Brian Cashman’s job.

As the nation becomes more and more a matter of the haves versus the have nots, a trend almost certain to continue along with the decline of American manufacturing, the job of a small market GM will become increasingly more difficult to succeed in. Unable to count on 40,000 fans a night even when the on-field product is good, these GM’s are faced with the unenviable position of being one injury, one slump, or one missed opportunity away from a string of losing seasons and, in all likelihood, unemployment.

But while success in the small markets of today’s baseball landscape is not easily found and even less easily maintained, long-term success is not out of the realm of possibility. The Minnesota Twins have proven this, winning 6 of the last 9 division titles largely without the benefit of a new stadium or a plethora of free agent acquisitions. But even they found themselves unable both to sustain that success as well as to take it to the next level and win a title, their no-name pitching staffs unable to compete with the star-laden rotations of the Yankees and (in their day) the Athletics over a short series. Unable to climb that hurdle, the Twins (with the benefit of a new stadium) made the fatal mistake of resigning hometown stars Joe Mauer and Justin Morneau, giving up the no-name bullpen that had become the staple of the Twins’ regular season domination throughout the decade. A few injuries later and the once strong Twins organization doesn’t look ready to contend anytime in the near future.

The Moneyball Athletics were able to flourish in a small market, in large part due to their unique approach to building a team and their groundbreaking reliance on statistical analysis over first-person scouting. But after dominated the AL West throughout the first half of the 2000’s, the Athletics organization has withered into a hopeless club whose only hope seems to be a new stadium and the potential tapping of additional market share in the Bay Area. While the A’s may not have made the mistake of sacrificing depth to keep beloved stars, they were unable to translate their knack for player evaluation into a knack for player development. The club also found out rather quickly that their Sabremetric approach didn’t translate as well to the amateur circuit as it did in the minor leagues, a problem come time where the loss of big name players to free agency netted the club nothing but compensation draft picks. A few poor drafts later the A’s seem relegated to fighting with the Mariners for 3rd place (out of 4) in the very AL West over which those two clubs reigned supreme throughout the first half of the 2000’s.

While seemingly every club has struggled with the realities of modern small market baseball, there is a formula for sustained success that can be had even without the benefit of the nine-figure payroll. It takes a tremendous amount of attention to detail, an excrutiating level of restraint, and a big picture attitude that is never set aside in favor of emotionally-charged attempts to increase the short term odds of a division title, a league pennant, or even a World Series championship.

First and foremost, baseball operations cannot accept the notion of the “hometown hero”. As difficult as it may be, small market teams have to convince their fan base to become emotionally attached to the team, to the team philosophy, even to the manager, but never to a player or group of players. Just as a farmer must fall in love the beef and not the cow (perhaps not the best of analogies to think about before a meal), a small market fan base must be convinced to accept the realities of seeing their jerseys become obsolete (there’s always a no-name replica), of childhood heroes moving on to greener pastures, of seemingly harmonious relationships with players coming to a sharp end the minute the clock strikes midnight on the eve of free agency. Instead of falling in love with the talent, fans must fall in love with the approach and show up at the ballpark accordingly.

The bottom line is that a string of four, five, six division titles in a row is just not within the realm of reality for many clubs. However, by staying focused on the process and on the long-term (with the support of a fan base willing to show up as much during the “off” years as during the years of contention), there is nothing stopping even the most desperate markets from supporting teams that are in a constant cycle of “one year away” followed by “true contender”, “division favorite”, and finally “World Series pick”.
That is the process that a small market team and its fan base have to accept. Those able to do so will not only find themselves able to rack up 4, 5, 6 playoff appearances in a given decade, but in the process will find perhaps as much joy in the “rebuilding years” as they do in the pennant chases.

For a while, the Twins had this formula down pat. Then they became frustrated with losing to the Yankees and chose to go all in by resigning Mauer and Morneau. This August 17th, I would bet any Twins fan out there would happily take another division series loss to the Yankees.

With the focus needing to stay on the long term process, on the meat instead of the cow, it is crucial that clubs turn free agency-eligible stars into two to three potential future stars each and every time that final contract year comes around. You have to be willing to trade away Lebron before “the Decision”, Manny Ramirez before “the Contract”, and Braylon Edwards before “the DUI” (ok, I couldn’t think of an example for the Browns).

When you boil it down, professional athletes are the commodities one needs to create a successful franchise. As a result, it is crucial that you do whatever necessary to ensure that you create more than adequate return on each and every investment.

As much as we like to criticize the Indians front office, they have done a pretty good job throughout the years of upholding many of the principals of this philosophy. While they made mistakes in signing both Grady Sizemore and Travis Hafner (Fausto Carmona as well) to long-term contracts, they have learned from these mistakes and made sure that more recent talent has not gone to waste. Yes, the organization will be known as the first to trade away Cy Young Winners in consecutive seasons, but let’s not forget that the first of those two netted a starting left fielder and very promising leadoff hitter in Michael Brantley (in addition to the fate-to-be-determined first baseman Matt Laporta). Cliff Lee then netted a plus-defensive catcher, a potential third basemen (and trade bait), and another young arm still making his way through the system with plenty of upside.

The biggest move might yet prove to be the trade of beloved catcher Victor Martinez (to be replaced by Carlos Santana, a prospect acquired earlier from the Dodgers in a trade for another beloved star in Casey Blake) to the Red Sox for Justin Masterson and Nick Hagadone. Hagadone still has the upside potential making his way up and Masterson is, less than two years later, a true ace (Boston actually committed a cardinal sin of their own by refusing to relinquish favorite prospect Clay Buchholz, only to see Buchholz struggle with injury for a large portion of the time since. But as I said, mistakes can be overcome much more easily with the back pocket checkbook).

By refusing to let the emotion of losing Martinez, a homebred and deeply respected leader in the clubhouse, get the best of them, the Indians front office set the stage for contention much sooner than many could have expected.

That is why the Ubaldo Jimenez trade is so puzzling. No one expected the Indians to contend in 2011, including the front office. The long term plan had been to put the club in a position to contend during the 2012 and 2013 seasons, up to the point at which the contracts of Sizemore and Hafner would expire and the organization could once again re-evaluate its approach. The hot start the club got off to in April and May was a surprise, much more so than the precipitous decline that put the Indians in a position of desperation come trade deadline time. With a bright future ahead, there was no reason for the club to make a move to get back in the race this year. The plan to contend in 2012 would be left intact and the experience of a pennant race would do nothing but good for a team that simply needs time to learn how to win at the major league level.

Adding Kosuke Fukudome made sense. The outfield had been decimated by injury and the Cubs weren’t asking much for the disappointing former star of the Japanese league. Add in the fact the Cubs picked up the majority of the $4.7 million remaining on Fukudome’s contract and it was clear this was a solid move that helped the present without sacrificing even the slightest bit of the promise the club had for the future.

Then the front office goes after Rockies ace Ubaldo Jimenez. While Jimenez was at one time in the not-too-distant past a budding star, his stock was clearly in decline after he followed up a 16-1 start to 2010 (including an oft-noted no-hitter) with X starts in which he finished just X-X with a worrisome X.XX ERA. Rumors of health and/or mental game issues were everywhere. Yes, the contract was good considering the upside Jimenez still had at the fairly youthful age of 27, but there were plenty of signs pointing toward him being damaged goods.

Alex White, the Indians’ 1st round pick in 2009, was on the path toward Major League stardom. Drafted as a closer out of UNC, he dominated the minor leagues out of the bullpen and as a starter, eventually earning a cup of coffee with the big club that came to an end with a worrying finger injury that put White on the 60-day DL after posting a solid 3.60 ERA in his first stint at the major league level.

Drew Pomeranz, the club’s 1st rounder in 2010, was certainly less polished a commodity, but the upside potential for this flame-throwing lefty was enormous. After dominating the A level in less than a year of professional time, Pomeranz was promoted to AA just prior to the all-star break, continuing a rapid climb that seemed to have the former Mississippi State star headed to the majors sometime in 2012.

These two young phenoms were to be the catalyst of a future for the Indians organization that seemed destined to result in the return of playoff baseball to the corner of Carnegie and Ontario. With the division lead having slipped away and the Tigers starting to catch their stride, it didn’t seem time at all for the Indians to go “all in”, good contract or not.

But they did it anyway.